Secrets

Attachments
Scheduling

The chat_request_secret tool collects a credential from the active user without exposing the raw value to the model or chat transcript.

Flow

  1. heypi creates a pending request and public key.
  2. The user opens the local admin secret page or hosted static secret page.
  3. The browser encrypts the value before submission.
  4. heypi decrypts it in the trusted process and stores it encrypted at rest under .heypi.

The encrypted reply can be submitted to /admin/secret or pasted into chat as !secret:<id>:<payload>. Secret replies are intercepted before Pi sees them. The raw secret is not written into /workspace and is not returned in the tool result.

The state root contains both encrypted values and secrets.key. Protect and back up that key with the state it decrypts. Filesystem permissions and host access remain the operator's responsibility.

Using collected credentials

Secret collection and credential use are separate concerns. Model-driven runtime commands do not receive collected secrets automatically. Expose credentials only through trusted-side tools, connections, or a runtime-specific credential broker.

Runtime env is model-visible and can be printed by Bash. Do not treat it as a secret store.

For a remote secret page, configure a trusted HTTPS page that performs the same browser-side encryption. Never ask users to paste plaintext credentials into Slack, Discord, or Telegram.